One of the main lines of research in functional encryption (FE) has consisted in studying the security notions for FE and their achievability. This study was initiated by where it was first shown that for FE the indistinguishabilitybased (IND) security notion is not sufficient in the sense that there are FE schemes that are provably IND-Secure but concretely insecure. For this reason, researchers investigated the achievability of Simulation-based (SIM) security, a stronger notion of security. Unfortunately, the above-mentioned works and others [e.g., have shown strong impossibility results for SIM-Security. One way to overcome these impossibility results was first suggested in the work of Boneh et al. where it was shown how to construct, in the Random Oracle (RO) model, SIM-Secure FE for restricted functionalities and was asked the generalization to more complex functionalities as a challenging problem in the area. Subsequently, proposed a candidate construction of SIM-Secure FE for all circuits in the RO model assuming the existence of an IND-Secure FE scheme for circuits with RO gates. This means that the functionality has to depend on the RO, thus it is not fixed in advance as in the standard definitions of FE. Moreover, to our knowledge there are no proposed candidate IND-Secure FE schemes for circuits with RO gates and they seem unlikely to exist. In this paper, we propose the first constructions of SIM-Secure FE schemes in the RO model that overcome the current impossibility results in different settings. We can do that because we resort to the two following models:
in the first ciphertext. So, the main technical problem is:
How can we force the adversary to feed the 2-inputs token with a second ciphertext that encrypts RO(tag c )?
Note that in the case of FE schemes that support functionalities with RO gates, this can be easily done by defining a new functionality that first tests whether the second input equals RO(tag c ), but in the "pure" RO model this solution can not be applied. Our patch is to add a new slot h of short size in the first ciphertext. Such value h is set to the hash of RO(tag c ) with respect to a Collision-Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) Hash, i.e., h = Hash(RO(tag c )). Furthermore, we modify the transformed functionality so that it first checks whether Hash(RO(tag c )) = h. If this test fails, the functionality outputs an error ⊥.
The intuition is that with this modification, the adversary is now forced to use a second ciphertext that encrypts RO(tag c ) since otherwise it gets ⊥ on both real or simulated ciphertext, and so, under the IND-Security of the MI-FE scheme, it seems that the adversary can not tell apart a real ciphertext from a simulated ciphertext. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove the security of this transformation assuming only the standard notion of IND-Security for MI-FE. In fact, notice that there exist second inputs for the modified functionality that distinguish whether the first input has the flag set to normal or trapdoor mode, namely inputs that correspond to collisions of Hash with respect to h and RO(tag c ). That is, any another second ciphertext that encrypt a value y = RO(tag c ) such that Hash(y) = h allows to distinguish whether the first ciphertext is in normal or trapdoor mode. Furthermore, it is not possible to make direct use of the security of the CRHF. The problem is that the definition of (2-inputs) MI-FE is too strong in that it requests the adversary to output two challenge message pairs (x 0 , y) and (x 1 , y) such that for any function f for which the adversary asked a query f (x 0 , ·) = f (x 1 , ·). In our case, this does not hold: there exists a set of collisions C such that for any z ∈ C, Hash(z) = h and f (x 0 , z) = f (x 1 , z). However, notice that it seems difficult for the adversary to find such collisions. Moreover, due to the requirement that the ciphertext must have short size, we are unable to use standard techniques already employed in literature. Our assumptions and CRIND-Security. For these reasons, we need to extend the notion of MI-FE to what we call collision-resistant indistinguishability (CRIND, in short) 4 . In Section 4 we provide an instantiation of this primitive from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input [BCP14] (cf. Remark 2.9). We think that this definition can be of independent interest since it is more tailored for the applicability of MI-FE to other primitives. We are aware that other possibilities to overcome our problem would be either to directly modify our transformation or to modify existing construction of MI-FE to satisfy this property, and thus avoiding the repeated use of obfuscation and NIZKs that we do. Nevertheless, we prefer to follow a modular approach to the aim of obtaining clear and simple constructions. Similar considerations also hold for the construction of CRIND-Secure MI-FE schemes and we leave to future research the generalization of this primitive and its construction from weaker assumptions. The reader may have noticed that the security of the second ciphertext guaranteed by the underlying MI-FE is not necessary. That is, our transformation would work even assuming 2-inputs MI-FE systems that take the second input in clear. In fact, CRIND-Security does not imply IND-Security for MI-FE schemes but this suffices for our scopes.
Roughly speaking, in CRIND-Security the security is quantified only with respect to valid adversaries 5 , where an adversary is considered valid if it only submits challenges m 0 , m 1 and asks a set of queries K that satisfy some "hardness" property called collision-resistance compatibility, namely that it is difficult to find a second input m 2 such that F (k, m 0 , m 2 ) = F (k, m 1 , m 2 ) for some k ∈ K. Since in the reductions to CRIND-Security it is not generally possible to directly check the hardness of (K, m 0 , m 1 ), the definition dictates (1) the existence of an efficient checker algorithm that approves only (but possibly not all) valid triples (K, m 0 , m 1 ) (i.e., the checker can detect efficiently if a triple is collision-resistant compatible) and (2) that an adversary is valid if it only asks triples approved by the checker. We defer the details of the definition to Section 2.3. Next, in a security reduction to CRIND-Security (i.e., when we need to prove the indistinguishability of two hybrid experiments assuming the CRIND-Security), the main task is to define an appropriate checker and prove that triples that are not collision-resistant compatible are rejected by it. This is usually done by checking that messages and keys satisfy an appropriate format. For instance, in the above case, the checker will check whether the machine (corresponding to the token) uses as sub-routine the specified CRHF and that the challenge messages and such machine have the right format.
The construction of CRIND-Secure schemes follows the lines of the construction of fully IND-Secure FE schemes of Boyle et al. Namely, the encryption of the first input m 1 will be an obfuscation of a machine that has embedded m 1 and a verification key for a signature scheme and takes as input a signature of a machine M and a second input m 2 and (1) checks the validity of the signature and (2) if such test passes outputs M (m 1 , m 2 ). For the same resonas of Boyle et al. we need to resort to functional signatures. Details along with a broader overview can be found in Section 4.
The above presentation is an oversimplification that skips some minor details and the modifications necessary to handle adaptive token queries and many ciphertext queries. We defer the reader to the Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for more details.
Our models and results. The reader may have noticed that the output of RO has to be "big", i.e., its size depends on the number of queries. Of course, we could assume that its range has constant size and replace a single invocation of the RO with range of size > q with many invocation of a RO with range of constant size, but also in this case the running-time of the encryption and decryption procedures would have to depend on the number of queries. Here, it is the novelty of our approach. All the parameters of our SIM-Secure public-key FE scheme (including ciphertexts and tokens) have constant size but the cost of the "expansion" is moved from the length of ciphertexts and tokens to the running-time of the encryption and decryption procedures. That is, our SIM-Secure public-key FE scheme stills depends on q in the setup and running-time, but the size of the ciphertexts and tokens is constant. The results we achieve can be summarized as follows:
• (q 1 , q c , poly)-SIM-Security with ciphertext of constant size and tokens of size q c . That is, SIM-Security against adversaries asking bounded non-adaptive token queries, bounded ciphertext queries, and unbounded adaptive token queries. In this case the size of the ciphertexts is constant but the size of the tokens grows as the number of ciphertext queries (and thus is constant in the case of 1 ciphertext query). This is known to be impossible in the standard model due to the impossibility of Agrawal et al. [AGVW13] (precisely this impossibility does not rule out the existence of schemes that satisfy this notion of security but it rules out the existence of schemes that satisfy both this notion of security and have short ciphertexts). Moreover, in this case the encryption and decryption procedures have running-times depending on q 1 .
• (q 1 , q c , q 2 )-SIM-Security with both ciphertexts and tokens of constant size. That is, SIM-Security against adversaries asking bounded token (both non-adaptive and adaptive) and ciphertext queries but with both ciphertext and token of constant size. In the standard model this is known to be impossible due to the impossibility result of De Caro and Iovino [CI13] for SIM-Security against adversaries asking unbounded ciphertext queries and bounded adaptive token queries (this impossibility is essentially an adaptation of the impossibility of Agrawal et al. [AGVW13] ). In this case, the encryption and decryption procedures have running-times depending on max{q 1 , q c , q 2 }.
• We show how to remove the afore-mentioned limitation in a variant of the symmetric-key model where ciphertexts and tokens are tagged with a timestamp that imposes an order on their generation (i.e., the i-th token/ciphertext generated in the system is tagged with the value i). This model is reasonable because in the symmetric-key setting, the user that set-up the system is the same entity that generates tokens and ciphertexts as well. 6 Moreover, most of the notable applications of FE are for the symmetric-key setting (e.g., to cloud computing, where a client delegates her encrypted data to a server and later can send tokens to the server to compute specific functions of her choice). We defer the reader to Section 3.3 for more details.
In the above presentation we skipped another technical issue that our approach faces. Specifically, in the Boolean circuit model, the token size would be at least as big as the total size of the bits encrypted in all ciphertext, thus of size dependent of q. Notice that this would already be an improvement with respect to the known bounded FE schemes for Boolean circuits of Gorbunov et al. [GVW12b] . However, for the sake of providing constructions with optimal parameters we work in the Turing Machine model of computation, though for all our results except that of Section 3.3 it is possible to provide slightly different constructions in the circuit model that improve the current results for the standard model. 7
The optimality and the soundness of our results. It is easy to see that SIM-Security in the standard model but for schemes with procedures of running-time dependent on the number of queries is impossible as well. Moreover, we think that SIM-Security in the RO model with a constant number of RO calls is impossible to achieve as well, though we were not able to prove an impossibility result for it and leave to future work to set positive or negative results. Anyway, one could object that if we instantiate the RO with any concrete hash function, the resulting scheme is not "SIM-Secure" due to the impossibility results. This problem is also shared with the constructions for the RO 
Definitions
A negligible function negl(k) is a function that is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in k. If D is a probability distribution, the writing "x ← D" means that x is chosen according to D. If D is a finite set, the writing "x ← D" means that x is chosen according to uniform probability on D. If q > 0 is an integer then [q] denotes the set {1, . . . , q}. All algorithms, unless explicitly noted, are probabilistic polynomial time and all adversaries are modeled by non-uniform polynomial time algorithms. If B is an algorithm and A is an algorithm with access to an oracle then A B denotes the execution of A with oracle access to B. If a and b are arbitrary strings, then a||b denotes the string representing their delimited concatenation. Building blocks. In Appendix B we recall the notion of functional signature schemes; in Appendix A.1 the notion of collision-resistant hash function; and in Appendix A.2 the notion of symmetric-key encryption.
Functional Encryption
Functional encryption schemes are encryption schemes for which the owner of the master secret can compute restricted keys, called tokens, that allow to compute a functionality on the plaintext associated with a ciphertext. We start by defining the notion of a functionality.
Definition 2.1 [Functionality]
A functionality F is a function F : K × M → Σ where K is the key space, M is the message space and Σ is the output space.
In this work, our FE schemes are for the following functionality 8 .
Definition 2.2 [p-TM Functionality] 9
The p-TM functionality for polynomial p() has key space K equals to the set of all Turing machines M , which satisfy the condition: the running time of M on any input m is exactly p(|m|) (depends only on the input length). The message space M is the set {0, 1} * . For M ∈ K and m ∈ M , we have p-TM(M,m)= M(m), In this work, for simplicity we assume that the output space is {0, 1}.
Remark 2.3
In case of a scheme with input-specific run time (cf. Definition C.1), we also require that the functionality outputs the run time of machine M on m along with the output of the computation M (m). We will only use schemes with input specific run time in Section 3.3. For the other applications bounded time is sufficient.
The definition of a FE scheme can be found in Appendix C. In Appendix C we recall the standard definition of indistinguishability-based and simulation-based security for functional encryption.
Multi-Input Functional Encryption
Multi-input functional encryption is analogous to functional encryption except that the functionality takes multiple inputs as argument. We recall the definition of multi-input functionalities and MI-FE in Appendix D. In Appendix D we recall the standard definition of indistinguishability-based security for multi-input functional encryption. In particular we would like to draw the attention of the reader on the definition D.2.
Remark 2.4
In this work we do not need to assume IND-Secure MI-FE schemes since we will construct CRIND-Secure MI-FE that suffice for our scopes. Specifically, for our purposes the underlying CRIND-Secure MI-FE scheme that we use could have an encryption procedure that encrypts the second input outputting it in clear. Alternatively, we could have defined a new primitive with its security. Instead, to avoid to introduce new syntax, we construct and use schemes that formally follow the syntax of MI-FE (with its correctness) but assuming a different and incomparable security notion for them.
Collision-Resistant Indistinguishability Security for MI-FE
As we mentioned in the construction overview sketched in Section 1, we need a different notion of MI-FE security. Here, we consider only the 2-inputs case, since this is suited for our main transformation but it is straightforward to extend it to the n-ary case.
Furthermore, in Section 4 we will show how to construct a CRIND-Secure MI-FE scheme from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input [BCP14] (cf. Remark 2.9). We presented an informal discussion of the definition in Section 1. We now present the formal definition.
The collision-resistant indistinguishability-based notion of security for a multi-input functional encryption scheme MI-FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality F defined over (K, M ) is formalized by means of the following experiment CRIND MI-FE A with an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ). Below, we present the definition for only one message; it is easy to see the definition extends naturally for multiple messages.
We make the following additional requirements:
• Collision-resistance compatibility. Let K denote a set of keys. We say that a pair of messages x 0 and x 1 is collision-resistant compatible with K if it holds that: any (possibly, nonuniform) PPT algorithm B given the security parameter 1 λ and (r, x 0 , x 1 ) for r uniformly distributed in {0, 1} λ , can find y satisfying inequality F (k, (x 0 ||r), y) = F (k, (x 1 ||r), y) for some k ∈ K with at most negligible (in λ) probability, where probability is taken over r R ← {0, 1} λ and the random coins of B. 10
• Efficient checkability. We assume that there exist efficient checker algorithm Checker, which takes as input (k, x 0 , x 1 ) and outputs false if x 0 and x 1 are not collision-resistant compatible with {k} (i.e., the singleton set containing the key k).
• Validity. We say that an adversary A in the above game is valid with respect to a checker Checker with efficient checkability if during the execution of the above game, A outputs challenge messages x 0 and x 1 of the same length and asks a set of queries K in the key space of the functionality such that for any k ∈ K, Checker(k, x 0 , x 1 ) = true (i.e., the adversary only asks queries and challenges approved by the checker).
The advantage of a valid adversary A in the above game is defined as
Definition 2.5
We say that a 2-inputs MI-FE scheme is collision-resistant indistinguishably secure (CRIND-Secure, in short) if for any checker Checker satisfying efficient checkability, it holds that all PPT adversaries A valid with respect to Checker have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
Remark 2.6 It can appear that the existence of this Checker is unlikely since it seems not possible to check the condition directly. Anyway, for large classes of functionalities this is possibly efficient. For instance, in our case the trapdoor machines have a specified format that includes a sub-routine for the CRHF Hash. The checker must only be able to check that this subroutine equal the code of Hash and that the trapdoor machine and the messages have the right format. For machines and messages that satisfy these checks, the condition of collisionresistance compatibility is guaranteed. There is no computational property to be checked here, but only a syntactical one.
Remark 2.7
We stress that CRIND-Security does not imply IND-Security for MI-FE but we do not need this. In fact, notice that for our applications the second input could be in clear.
We also point out that the notion of CRIND-Security could be generalized so to have as special case IND-Security but to not overburden the presentation we do not do this and defer it to the Master's Thesis of the second author.
Extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input
Boyl et al. [BCP14] defined obfuscators secure against general distributional auxiliary input. We recall their definition (cf. Remark 2.9). 10 It can appear that the definition be not well-defined because we do not specify how the key k is related to the security parameter. To understand this, you may imagine that k be the code of some algorithm P (ant thus of constant-size) to compute a keyed hash function Hash(·, ·). The program P takes an hashing key s computed with respect to an arbitrarily long security parameter λ and an input x and computes Hash(s, x). Therefore in the above definition, k (along with the functionality F ) plays the role of P and thus can have constant size whereas r plays the role of the hashing key s that depends instead on the security parameter. 
Note that in the above definition the extractor E may depend on the the adversary A and the distribution D.
Remark 2.9 In light of the recent "implausibility" results on extractability obfuscation with auxiliary input [GGHW13, BP13], we would like to point out that our results are based on specific distributions for which no implausibility result is known. Same considerations were also made in [BCP14] .
3 Our Transformations 3.1 (q 1 , q c , poly)-SIM-Security
In this section, we show that assuming a CRIND-Secure (in the standard model) MI-FE scheme for p-TM 2 (2-inputs Turing machines with run time equal to a polynomial p) for any polynomial p, it is possible to construct a SIM-Secure functional encryption scheme in the RO model for functionality p-TM for any polynomial p. Moreover, this is possible also for FE schemes with input-specific run time. The resulting scheme is secure for a bounded number of messages and non-adaptive token queries, and unbounded number of adaptive key queries. Moreover, it enjoys ciphertexts and tokens of size not growing with the number of non-adaptive queries, overcoming the impossibility result of Agrawal et al. [AGVW13] for the standard model. In Section 4 we will show how to construct a CRIND-Secure MI-FE from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input [BCP14] (cf. Remark 2.9).
Trapdoor Machines
The idea of our transformations is to replace the original machine with a "trapdoor" one that the simulator can use to program the output in some way. This approach is inspired by the FLS paradigm introduced by Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS90] to obtain zero-knowledge proof systems from witness indistinguishable proof systems. Below we present the construction of trapdoor machine, which works in standard model. 
RO-based Transformation
Overview. In Section 1 we sketched a simplified version of our transformation. Here, we present an overview with more details. The idea is to put additional "slots" in the plaintexts and secret keys that will only be used by the simulator. A plaintext contains five slots and a secret key contains two slots. In the plaintext, the first slot is the actual message m. The second slot is a bit flag indicating whether the ciphertext is in trapdoor mode. The third slot is a random key sk used by SE scheme, the fourth slot is a hash h of RO(tag c ) (computed with respect to a CRHF) attached to the ciphertext and finally the fifth slot contains a hash function key k H .
In the secret key, the first slot encodes the actual machine M and the second slot is a random tag tag k = (id k , c). Slot id k is used by simulator to identify pre-challenge tokens and c is used to convey programmed output value in post-challenge tokens. For evaluation, if the ciphertext is not in trapdoor mode (i.e., flag = 0) then the functionality simply evaluates the original machine M of the message m. If the ciphertext is in trapdoor mode, depending on the nature of the secret key (non-adaptive or adaptive), for tag k = (id k , c), if for some i ∈ [q], (id k , v) = SE.Dec(sk, R i ), then the functionality outputs v, otherwise it outputs SE.Dec(sk, c). Here R i is the i-th element in the string R that the machine takes as second input, and is set by the (honest) evaluation procedure to RO(tag c ).
For sake of simplicity we assume that TM functionality, for which our scheme is constructed, has output space {0, 1}. The construction can be easily extended to work for any TM functionality with bounded output length. In our construction we assume that the output length of the programmable random oracle RO equals q · ν (cf. Remark 3.6).
We define a new (single-input) functional encryption scheme SimFE[Hash, SE] = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality p-TM as follows. , this can be done by replacing c in the token with q c values to program the answers to the q c challenge ciphertexts but we omit details. We remark that the bound q 1 does not affect the value p because p is polynomial in the length of the input messages and not on the security parameter and this fact rules out the problem that p would have to be set to a value > max{q 1 , q c } to allow the machine to read the inputs. Moreover, the transformation would need to take as input such bounds q 1 , q c (cf. Remark C.7) but for simplicity we omitted such details.
Remark 3.4 If the underlying scheme has input specific run time (cf. Definition C.1) then we are able to provide a modified construction, with input-specific run time as well. Note that in this case the simulator receives the run time of any queried machine on the challenge message (cf. Remark 2.3), since the functionality returns it along with the output of the computation. Therefore the simulator can program not only the desired output value, but could also eventually extend the run time of the trapdoor machine.
Remark 3.5 Actually we should use a machine that has running time depending only on input lengths (cf. Definition D.2), expressed as a polynomial. Therefore, in practice instead of M = Trap[M, Hash, SE] tag k we would take a machine that runs M and then extends the running-time to the desired value p (·). To not overburden the presentation we omit this detail.
Remark 3.6 Alternatively, instead of using and program RO at one input tag c and having output proportionally long to q, we could program it at q inputs (tag c , 1), . . . , (tag c , q). This way we could avoid the correlation between q and RO output length. However, for simplicity we resort to the first option. Security proof overview. We conduct the security proof of our construction by a standard hybrid argument. To move from real world experiment to ideal one we use the following hybrid experiments:
• The first hybrid experiment corresponds to the real experiment.
• The second hybrid experiment is identical to the previous one except that the random oracle is programmed at point tag c so to output the encryption of the desired output values on pre-challenge queries, and post-challenge queries are answered with tokens that have embedded appropriate encrypted output values. Moreover, all these values are encrypted using the underlying SE scheme with a randomly chosen secret-key sk . Notice that in this experiment the secret-key sk is uncorrelated to the secret-key sk embedded in ciphertext.
• The third hybrid experiment is identical to the previous one except that the ciphertext contains the same secret-key sk used to program the RO.
• In last step we switch the flag slot in the ciphertext to 1 indicating the trapdoor mode. At the same time we change the content of message slot m to 0 |m| . This is necessary due to the fact that simulator only knows the challenge message length, but not the message itself.
One can reduce the security of first two transitions to the ciphertext pseudo-randomness of SE scheme and to the CRIND-Security of underlying MI-FE scheme. The proof in these cases is pretty straightforward. One could be tempted to reduce the indistinguishability security of last two hybrids to both collision resistance of used hash function and IND-Security on MI-FE. However, the security reduction is not obvious. The adversary could recognize the simulation by finding a string R different from RO(tag c ) for which Hash(k H , R) = Hash(k H , RO(tag c )), and applying the evaluation algorithm to this value as second input. The output of evaluation algorithm in this case would be different than expected. Although the adversary would contradict the collision resistance of Hash, we are not able to construct algorithm based on that adversary, which breaks the hash function security.
Therefore we need to rely on the CRIND-Security of MI-FE. Moreover, for completeness we will only assume CRIND-Security and never IND-Security.
Proof: Suppose that there is an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) against SimFE that outputs at most 1 message, q = q(λ) pre-challenge and p = p(λ) post-challenge token queries. Note that here p is an unbounded polynomial, not fixed a priori, but q is fixed a priori. We construct a simulator Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) as follows (note that simulator can program the random oracle RO).
• Let m be the challenge message output by A 0 .
Sim 0 receives as input the message length |m|, the public parameter Pk = (Ek 1 , Ek 2 , r), the q non-adaptive key queries M 1 , . . . , M q made by A 0 , along with the values z 1 = M 1 (m), . . . , z q = M q (m) and the tokens (Tok 1 , tag k1 ), . . . , (Tok q , tag kq ) generated by KeyGen to answer A 0 's non-adaptive token queries, where tag ki = (id ki , c i ). Sim 0 proceeds as follows.
The simulator chooses random sk R ← {0, 1} λ and sets k H = r, and stores them in the state st .
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ q, the simulator computes R i = SE.Enc(sk, (id ki , z i )) and concatenates the encryptions as R = R 1 || . . . ||R q .
The simulator chooses random tag c ∈ {0, 1} λ and programs random oracle output by setting RO(tag c ) = R.
Sim 0 computes Ct ← MI-FE.Enc(Ek 1 , (0 |m| , 1, sk, Hash(k H , R), k H )) and outputs pair (Ct, tag c ).
• Sim 1 answers the adaptive query for machine M j for j = 1, . . . , p, by having on input the master secret key Msk and z j = M j (m), in the following way. We now prove that Sim is a good simulator, which means that for all PPT adversaries A = (A 0 , A 1 ), RealExp SimFE,A and IdealExp SimFE,A Sim are computationally indistinguishable. Recall that, in the random oracle model, these views include all queries made to the random oracle and the responses. This is proved via a sequence of hybrid experiments as follows.
• Hybrid H A 0 : This is the real experiment RealExp SimFE,A .
• Hybrid H A 1 : This is the real experiment RealExp SimFE,A , except that at the beginning of the experiment an additional random secret key sk R ← {0, 1} λ is chosen and the output of random oracle at point tag c is programmed as follows. Let tag k1 = (id k1 , c 1 ), . . . , tag kq = (id kq , c q ) be tags of the tokens returned to adversary at pre-challenge stage. Random oracle is programmed at point tag c as follows:
RO(tag c ) = SE.Enc(sk , (id k1 , M 1 (m)))|| . . . ||SE.Enc(sk , (id kq , M q (m))) Additionally, the A 1 's key queries for any machine M are answered with tokens, containing tags tag k computed as tag k = (id k , SE.Enc(sk , M (m))). Notice that instead in the previous hybrid experiment tag k is computed as tag k = (id k , c) for random id k and c.
• Hybrid H A 2 : We change the way the secret key sk is chosen. Namely, instead of setting it at random we set sk = sk, where sk is the same secret key encrypted in the third slot of the MI-FE ciphertext. In this experiment random oracle is programmed at point tag c as follows:
RO(tag c ) = SE.Enc(sk, (id k1 , M 1 (m)))|| . . . ||SE.Enc(sk, (id kq , M q (m)))
• Hybrid H We now show that the relevant distinguishing probabilities between adjacent hybrids are negligible, which completes the proof.
Hybrid H A 0 to Hybrid H A 1 : This transition reduces to the ciphertext pseudo-randomness of the underlying SE scheme (See Appendix A.2). For sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a distinguisher D that distinguishes with non-negligible probability the output distribution of H A 0 and H A 1 . Then, A and D can be used to construct a successful adversary B that breaks the ciphertext pseudo-randomness of SE playing against its oracle (that is either Encrypt or O, see Appendix A.2). Specifically, B does the following.
• B runs SimFE.Setup honestly obtaining a pair (Pk, Msk) and runs A 0 (Pk).
A 0 's key queries for machines M 1 , . . . , M q are answered honestly by running SimFE.KeyGen(Msk, M i ). Let the tags attached to the returned tokens be tag k1 = (id k1 , c 1 ), . . . , tag kq = (id kq , c q ).
B simulates answers to A 0 's random oracle queries. For any input query it responses with random string and stores the output value for following queries.
Eventually, A 0 outputs challenge message m and the state st. • B runs distinguisher D on input (Pk, m, α) and outputs his guess as its own.
A asks RO for tag c before the challenge with negligible probability. Now notice that if this event does not happen, then if the oracle of B returns truly random strings in response to B's queries then the view of A is exactly the view in H A 0 and if the oracle returns encryptions of queried values then the view of A is exactly the view in H A 1 . Hence B breaks the ciphertext pseudo-randomness of SE with non-negligible probability.
Hybrid H A 1 to Hybrid H A 2 : The indistinguishability of these two hybrid experiments reduces to CRIND-Security of the starting MI-FE scheme with respect to some checker Checker to be defined later. For sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a distinguisher D that distinguishes with non-negligible probability the output distribution of H A 1 and H A 2 . Then, A and D can be used to construct a successful CRIND adversary B for MI-FE with respect to some checker Checker that we will define later. Specifically, B = (B 0 , B 1 ) does the following. Eventually, A 0 outputs message m and the state st, which are stored in B 0 state.
Then B 0 chooses random sk and sets k H = r, encrypts C i ← SE.Enc(sk, (id ki , M i (m))) and programs the random oracle by setting RO(tag c ) = C 1 || . . . ||C q .
It also chooses random sk and outputs two challenge messages: (m, 0, sk, h) and (m, 0, sk , h) where h = Hash(k H , RO(tag c )). B 1 receives as input encryption of one of challenge messages concatenated with k H = r.
• B 1 on input key Mpk, a ciphertext Ct 1 and the state st, runs A 1 on the input (Pk = (Mpk, r), Ct 1 , st). Eventually, A 1 outputs α, then B 1 invokes D on input (Pk = (Mpk, r), m, α) and returns D's guess as its own.
Notice that if the challenger returns encryption of (m, 0, sk , h, k H ) then the view of A is the same as in H A 1 , and if the challenger returns encryption of (m, 0, sk, h, k H ) then the view of A is the same as in H A 2 . Hence, if D distinguishes these two cases then B guesses the right bit in the game of the CRIND-security of MI-FE, since sk = sk only with negligible probability. It remains to prove the following claim. Notice that the trapdoor machines have a specified format that includes a sub-routine for a CRHF Hash. The checker must only check that this subroutine equals the code of Hash and that the trapdoor machine and the messages have the right format, specifically that the machine has the format of our trapdoor machines with the right sub-routine Hash and that both messages has flag set to normal mode and contain the same hash value h. Note that if this format is guaranteed, then the evaluations of Trap[M i , Hash, SE] tag ki are equal for any second argument. For machines and messages that satisfy these checks, the condition of collision-resistance compatibility is guaranteed and the checker will output true, otherwise it will output false. As a consequence, if the the inputs m 0 , m 1 and M to the checker do not satisfy the property of collision-resistance compatibility, it follows that the machine M or the messages can not have the required format, and thus the checker will output false, as it was to prove. Furthermore, by construction, the trapdoor machines queried by B make the Checker always output true.
Hybrid H A 2 to Hybrid H A 3 : The indistinguishability of these two hybrids reduces to the CRIND-Security (with respect to some checker Checker with efficient checkability) of the underlying MI-FE scheme. For sake of contradiction, suppose there exists an adversary D that distinguishes with non-negligible probability the output distributions of H A 2 and H A 3 . Then, A and D can be used to construct a successful adversary B against the CRIND-Security of MI-FE with respect to a checker Checker that we will define later. Specifically, B = (B 0 , B 1 ) does the following. ). It is easy to see that this contradicts the security of the collision-resistance hash function Hash, because k H is chosen at random, and therefore will occur with negligible probability. This is proven in the following claim.
It remains to prove the following claim. Notice that the trapdoor machines have a specified format that includes a sub-routine for a CRHF Hash. The checker must only check that this subroutine equals the code of Hash and that the trapdoor machine and the messages have the right format, specifically that the machine has the format of our trapdoor machines with the right sub-routine Hash and that one of the messages has flag set to normal mode and the other one has flag set to trapdoor mode and both messages have the same hash value h and same secret-key sk. For machines and messages that satisfy these checks, the condition of collision-resistance compatibility is guaranteed and the checker will output true, otherwise it will output false. As a consequence, if the the inputs m 0 , m 1 and M to the checker do not satisfy the property of collision-resistance compatibility, it follows that the machine M or the messages can not have the required format, and thus the checker will output false, as it was to prove. Furthermore, by construction, the trapdoor machines queried by B make the Checker always output true.
Remark 3.11
The reader may have noticed that the security of the second ciphertext guaranteed by the underlying MI-FE is not necessary. That is, our transformation would work even assuming 2-inputs MI-FE systems that take the second input in clear. Moreover, the theorem would hold even assuming a MI-FE scheme CRIND-Secure only with respect to adversaries asking bounded non-adaptive and ciphertext queries and unbounded adaptive queries, and satisfying the same efficiency requirements. This holds for the transformation of Section 3.2 as well.
(q 1 , q c , q 2 )-SIM-Security with short tokens
The previous transformation suffers from the problem that the size of the tokens grows as the number of ciphertext queries q c . In this Section we show how to achieve (q 1 , q c , q 2 )-SIM-Security. Notice that in the standard model constructions satisfying this level of security like the scheme of Gorbunov et al. [GVW12b] have short ciphertexts and tokens. Moreover, De Caro and Iovino [CI13] showed an impossibility result for this setting. Our transformation assumes a 3-inputs MI-FE scheme (CRIND-Secure in the standard model). The resulting scheme is (q 1 , q c , q 2 )-SIM-Secure according to the definition with simulated setup (cf. Remark C.6). The idea is very similar to the transformation presented in Section 3.1. Sketch of the transformation.
The tokens will be symmetrical to the the ciphertexts. Specifically, a token in our scheme consists of a token T for a 3-inputs MI-FE scheme and a tag tag k with the following changes. The token T has an additional slot containing the hash of RO(tag k ) and an identifier id t and the ciphertext has a additional slot containing an identifier id c . In normal mode both identifiers are set to random strings. In the simulated experiment, the identifiers will be ciphertexts encrypted with the same secret-key used in the other slot of the ciphertext. Let us denote by id t and id c the values encrypted in id t and id c . In trapdoor mode, the functionality checks whether id c > id t . In such case the functionality works as before taking the output from the RO programmed at point RO(tag k ). Instead, if id c < id t , the functionality takes the output from RO(tag c ). In both normal and trapdoor mode, the functionality checks whether both hash values are correct (that is, it checks whether the hash value in the token equals the hash of RO(tag k ) and that the hash value in the ciphertext equals the hash of RO(tag c )) and if one of the tests does not pass, the functionality returns error. During the simulation, these identifiers will contain a temporal index increasing over time (that is the i-th token or ciphertext will contain an identifier that encrypts i). Notice that since we need to simulate tokens (to set the identifiers to the encryption of the correct timestamp), we need to weaken the security to allow simulated setup (cf. Remark C.6).
The token T of our MI-FE scheme is for a machine Trap that takes 3 inputs: the message (extended as usual with the additional slots), and two random strings R c and R k , which are used to decrypt in trapdoor mode, and works in the obvious way by executing Trap on the three inputs. Finally, in the simulated experiment, the RO is programmed to output a fixed number max q 1 , q c , q 2 of ciphertexts, value that is proportional to the running-times of the procedures as well. Security. The security proof is identical to that of our main transformation with few changes. We first need to switch the slot of the identifiers in both ciphertexts and tokens to be encryption of the the temporal index. Then we proceed as before.
(poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security in the Timestamp model
We recall that any known impossibility results in the standard model also apply to the symmetrickey setting. In this Section we show how to achieve unbounded SIM-Security in the RO model in a variant of the symmetric-key setting that we call the timestamp model. Moreover, our scheme enjoys ciphertexts and tokens of constant size. The timestamp model is identical to the symmetric-key mode except for the following changes:
• The encryption and key generation procedures also take as input a temporal index or timestamp. The security of this index is not required. The security experiments are identical to those of the symmetric-key model except that the queries are answered by providing tokens and ciphertexts with increasing temporal index (the exact value does not matter until as long as are ordered in order of invocation). Roughly speaking, this is equivalent to saying that the procedures are stateful. Notice that in the symmetric-key model, this change has no cost since the user who set-up the system can keep the value of the current timestamp and guarantee that ciphertexts and tokens are generated with timestamps of increasing order.
• For simplicity, we also assume that there is a decryption key. Precisely, the evaluation algorithm takes as input a token, a ciphertext and a decryption key. It is easy to see that this decryption key can be removed at the cost of including it in any token or ciphertext.
Sketch of the transformation. With these changes in mind it is easy to modify the scheme of Section 3.2 to satisfy (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security in the RO model. Precisely, the slots for the identifiers will contain the temporal index in clear 12 . In the scheme, the tags will be such that the (both non-programmed and programmed) RO on these input will output a string of size proportional to i, where i is the temporal index. This can be done by assuming that the RO outputs a single bit and invoking it many times. That is, instead of computing RO(tag c ), the procedures will compute RO(tag c ||j) for j = 1, . . . , m where m is the needed size. For simplicity, henceforth, we assume that the RO outputs strings of variable-length. As byproduct, we need to program the RO on the tag tag c (resp. tag k ) of a ciphertext (resp. token) with timestamp i to only output i ciphertexts. Thus, we do not need to fix in advance any bound, which was the only limitation of the previous transformations. Notice that the evaluation algorithm needs to encrypt the output of RO(tag c ) and RO(tag k ) and this is done by using the encryption keys Ek 2 and Ek 3 for the second and third input. This is the reason why we assume that there is a decryption key that in this scheme consists of the pair (Ek 2 , Ek 3 ).
Security. The security proof is identical to that of the transformation of Section 3.2 with further simplifications due to the fact that we do not need to have the temporal index encrypted.
We first need to switch the slot of the identifiers in both ciphertext and tokens to be encryption of the the temporal index. Then the proof proceeds as before.
4 Constructions of CRIND-Secure MI-FE from eO
Overview. In order to achieve CRIND-security of MI-FE (as defined in Section 2.3), we make use of the following ideas inspired by the construction of fully IND-Secure FE of Boyle et al. [BCP14] . We assume a functional signature scheme FS [BGI13] . Namely, our encryption procedure takes as input the first input m 1 and produces an obfuscation of a machine that has embedded m 1 and takes as input a second message m 2 and a functional signature for some function f and (1) verifies the signature and (2) outputs f (m 1 , m 2 ). Roughly speaking, we want prevent the adversary to be able to find distinguishing inputs. To this scope, we need to forbid the adversary from evaluating the machine on functions for which it did not see a signature. For the same reasons as in Boyle et al. it is not possible to use a standard signature scheme. This is because, the adversary A against eO needs to produce a view to the adversary B against CRIND-Security, and in particular to simulate the post-challenge tokens. To that aim, A would need to receive an auxiliary input z containing the signing key of the traditional signature scheme but in this case an extractor with access to z could easily find a distinguishing input. As in Boyle et al. we resort to functional signatures. We recall their ideas. In the scheme, they put a functional signing key that allows to sign any function. In the security proof, they use the property of function privacy to show that the original experiment is computationally indistinguishable to an experiment where the post-challenge queries are answered with respect to a restricted signing key for the Boolean predicate that is verified on all and only the machines T for which T (m 0 ) = T (m 1 ), where m 0 and m 1 are the challenges chosen by the adversary against IND-Security. Thus, putting this restricted signing key in the auxiliary distribution does not hurt of the security since an extractor can not make use of it to find a distinguishing input.
In the case of CRIND-Security, it is not longer true that T (m 0 ) = T (m 1 ) but we will invoke the properties of the checker and we set the Boolean predicate to one that is verified for all machines T approved by the checker with respect to the challenges, i.e., such that Checker(T, m 0 , m 1 ) = 1. Then, by the property of the checker and valid adversaries, it follows that for any machine T for which the valid adversary asked a query, it is difficult to find a second input m 2 such that T (m 0 , m 2 ) = T (m 1 , m 2 ). Thus, the existence of an extractor for our distribution would contradict the hypothesis that the adversary is valid and only asked queries for machines and challenges satisfying the collision-resistance compatibility. Precisely, we have the following transformation. For any message m 1 and verification key vk of FS, let us define a machine M m 1 (where for simplicity we omit the other parameters in subscript) that takes two inputs, a signature σ T of machine T and a message m 2 , and performs the following:
• The machine verifies the signature σ T according to vk, and if it is an invalid signature, it returns ⊥;
• The machine returns T (m 1 , m 2 ).
We define a new 2-inputs functional encryption scheme CRFE[eO, FS] = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality TM 2 as follows 13
• Setup(1 λ ): chooses a pair (msk, vk) ← FS.Setup(1 λ ) and generates a key sk 1 ← FS.KeyGen(msk, 1) that allows signing all messages (i.e., for the always-accepting predicate 1(T ) = T ∀ T ). It sets Ek 1 = Ek 2 = vk and outputs Mpk = Ek 1 and Msk = (sk 1 , vk).
• Enc(Ek, m): depending on whether Ek is an encryption key for first or second input:
where M m is defined as above with respect to m and vk (recall that for simiplicity we omit the subscript for vk).
if Ek = Ek 2 then outputs the message m in clear (recall that we are not interested in the security of the second input and we adopted the formalism of multi-input FE to avoid the need of a new syntax and for sake of generality, e.g., providing in future constructions that satisfy both IND-Security and CRIND-Security).
• KeyGen(Msk, T ): on input Msk = (sk 1 , vk) and a machine T , the algorithm generates a signature on T via σ T ← Signature.Sign(sk 1 , T) and outputs token σ T . Proof: We define the following hybrids. Let q(λ) be a bound on the number of post-challenge token queries asked by B in any execution with security parameter 1 λ . Such bound exists because B is a PPT algorithm.
• Hybrid H B 0 : This is the real experiment CRIND
• Hybrid H B i , i = 0, . . . , q : Same as the previous hybrid, except that the first i postchallenge token queries are answered with respect to a restricted signing key sk C for the Boolean predicate C that allows one to sign exactly Turing machines T for which Checker(T, m 0 , m 1 ) = 1. (This is one of the differences with the proof of Boyle et al. wherein, being the scope to prove IND-Security, the signing key is for a predicate that allows one to sign exactly the machines T for which T (m 0 ) = T (m 1 ). This is not possible in our case, but we make use of the definition of valid adversary that dictates that such adversary will only make queries for machines approved by the checker.). Specifically, at the beginning of the game the challenger generates a restricted signing key sk C ← FS.KeyGen(Msk, C). The pre-challenge queries are answered using the standard signing key sk 1 as in hybrid H 0 . The first i post-challenge token queries are answered using the restricted key sk C , that is a token query for machine T is answered with σ T ← FS.Sign(sk C , T). All remaining token queries are anwered using the standard key sk 1 . We prove the claim by using the function privacy property of FS. Namely, for any i ∈ [q], consider the following adversary A priv (1 λ ) against function privacy of FS.
• A i priv is given keys (vk, msk) ← FS.Setup(1 λ ) from the function privacy challenger.
• A i priv submits the all-accepting function 1 as the first of its two challenge functions, and receives a corresponding signing key sk 1 ← FS.KeyGen(msk, 1).
• A i priv simulates interaction with B. First, it forwards vk to B as the public-key and chooses a random string r ∈ {0, 1} λ . For each token query T made by B, it generates a signature on T using key sk 1 .
• A i priv At some point B outputs a pair of messages m 0 , m 1 . A i priv generates a challenge ciphertext in the CRIND-Security game by sampling a random bit b and encrypting (m b ||r) and sending it to B.
• A i priv submits as its second challenge function C (as defined above). It receives a corresponding signing key sk C ← FS.KeyGen(msk, P C ).
• A i priv now simulates interaction with B as follows. For the first i − 1 post-challenge token queries T made by B, A i priv generates a signature using key sk C , i.e., σ T ← FS.Sign(sk C , T). For B's i-th post-challenge query, A i priv submits the pair of preimages (T, T ) to the function privacy challenger (note that 1(T ) = C(T ) = T ) since, being B a valid adversary, it only asks queries T such that Checker(T, m 0 , m 1 ) = 1), and receives a signature σ T generated either using key sk 1 or key sk C . A i priv generates the remaining post-challenge queries of B using key sk 1 .
• Eventually B outputs a bit b . If b = b is a correct guess, then A i priv outputs function 1; otherwise, it outputs function C.
Note that if the function privacy challenger selected the function 1, then A i priv perfectly simulates hybrid H B i−1 , otherwise it perfectly simulates hybrid H B i . Thus, the advantage of A i priv is exactly the difference in guessing the bit b in the two hybrids, H B i and H B i−1 and the claim follows from the function privacy property.
Next, we define the following distribution D depending on B. • D generates a signing key sk C for the function C as defined above and machines M m 0 ||r and M m 1 ||r as defined above (recall that as usual we omit to specify the subscript relative to vk).
• D outputs the tuple (M m 0 ||r , M m 1 ||r , z = (view B , sk C )).
We now can construct an adversary A(1 λ , M , M 0 , M 1 , z) against the security of eO.
• A takes as input the security parameter 1 λ , an obfuscation M of machine M b for randomly chosen bit b, two machines M 0 and M 1 , and auxiliary input z = (view B , sk C ).
• Using view B , A returns B to the state of execution as in the corresponding earlier simulation during the D sampling process.
• Simulate the challenge ciphertex to B as M . For each subsequent token query M made by B, A answers it by producing a signature on M using sk C .
• Eventually, B outputs a bit b for the challenge ciphertext that A returns as its own guess.
Note that the interaction with the adversary B in sampling from D is precisely a simulation in hybrid H B q up to the point in which B outputs the challenge messages,and the interaction with B made by A is precisely a simulation of the remaining steps in hybrid H B q . We are assuming that the advantage of B in hybrid H i q is ≥ 2a(λ) for some non-negligible function a(λ). This implies that there is a polynomial p(λ) such that for an infinite set S of values λ, it holds that the advantage of B in hybrid H i q for parameter λ is greater than 1/2p(λ). Thus, by an averaging argument, for all λ ∈ S, A's advantage (with respect to λ) in guessing the bit b on which it is challenged upon is greater than 1/p with probability greater than 1/p over the output of D. By the security of eO this implies a corresponding PPT extractor E and polynomial q(λ) and negligible function negl(λ) such for all λ ∈ S, with probability 1 − negl(λ) over the output
. This implies that for an infinite number of values λ, with probability ≥ 1/p(λ) − negl(λ) over the output
We now show that such PPT extractor can not exist. Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists such extractor that outputs a signature σ A for some machine A , and a second input m 2 that distinguishes M m 0 ||r from M m 1 ||r . We note that any signature output by the extractor must be a valid signature for a machine A for which the adversary asked a query. This follows from the unforgeability of FS. From this fact, and from the fact that the checker approved the triple (A, m 0 , m 1 ), it follows that m 0 and m 1 are collision-resistant compatible with {A}. Therefore, this adversary can be used to break the collision-resistance compatibility with respect to m 0 and m 1 and {A}, contradicting the hypothesis.
It is trivial to see that the claim on input-specific run time holds if the the scheme is used with Turing machines of input-specific run time and that the claim on the succinctness follows easily from our construction and the succinctness of FS. This concludes the proof.
A Standard Notions

A.1 Collision-resistant Hash Functions
Definition A.1 [Collision-resistant Hash Functions] We say that a pair of PPT algorithms (Gen, Hash) is collision-resistant hash function (CRHF in short) if:
• Gen(1 λ ) outputs a key s.
• There exists some polynomial l(λ) such that Hash on input 1 λ and x ∈ {0, 1} outputs a string y ∈ {0, 1} l(λ) . If H(s, ·) is only defined for inputs x of length l (λ), where l (λ) > l(λ), we say that (Gen, Hash) is a fixed-length collision-resistant hash function for inputs of length l .
• It holds that for any (possibly, non-uniform) PPT adversary A the probability of winning in the following game is negligible in λ: where the probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithms.
Definition A.3 [Ciphertext Pseudo-randomness] A symmetric-key encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) has pseudo-random ciphertexts if for every ppt adversary A we have that the following quantity is negligible in s:
where O(1 s , ·) is a randomized oracle that on input message M returns a string independently and uniformly chosen in {0, 1} ν(s) . • FS.Verify(mvk, m * , σ) → {0, 1}: the verification algorithm takes as input the master verification key mvk, a message m and a signature and outputs 1 if the signature is valid.
B Functional Signature Schemes
We say that FS is a functional signature scheme for unbounded-length messages if M = {0, 1} * . We require the following conditions to hold:
• The challenger honestly generates a key pair (msk, mvk) ← FS.Setup(1 λ ) and gives both values to the adversary. (Note wlog this includes the randomness used in generation).
• The adversary chooses a function f 0 and receives an (honestly generated) secret key sk f 0 ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f 0 ).
• The adversary chooses a second function f 1 for which |f 0 | = |f 1 | (where padding can be used if there is a known upper bound) and receives an (honestly generated) secret key sk f 1 ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f 1 ).
• The adversary chooses a pair of values (m 0 , m 1 ) for which |m 0 | = |m 1 | and f 0 (m 0 ) = f 1 (m 1 ).
• The challenger selects a random bit b R ← {0, 1} and generates a signature on the image message m = f 0 (m 0 ) = f 1 (m 1 ) using secret key sk f b , and gives the resulting signature σ ← FS.Sign(sk f b , m b ) to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs bit b , and wins the game if b = b.
Succinctness:
The size of a signature σ ← FS.Sign(sk f , m) is bounded by a polynomial in security parameter λ, and the size of the output |f (m)|. In particular, it is independent of |m|, the size of the input to the function, and |f |, the size of a description of the function f .
C FE and its IND-Security
Let us now define the notion of a functional encryption scheme FE for a functionality F .
Definition C.1 [Functional Encryption Scheme]
A functional encryption scheme FE for functionality F is a tuple FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) of 4 algorithms with the following syntax:
Indistinguishability-based security. The indistinguishability-based notion of security for functional encryption scheme FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality F defined over (K, M ) is formalized by means of the following game IND FE A between an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) and a challenger C. Below, we present the definition for only one message; it is easy to see the definition extends naturally for multiple messages.
IND FE
A (1 λ ) 1. C generates (Pk, Msk) ← Setup(1 λ ) and runs A 0 on input Pk; 2. A 0 submits queries for keys k i ∈ K for i = 1, . . . , q 1 and, for each such query, C computes Tok i = KeyGen(Msk, k i ) and sends it to A 0 .
When A 0 stops, it outputs two challenge plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M satisfying |m 0 | = |m 1 | and its internal state st.
3. C picks b ∈ {0, 1} at random, computes the challenge ciphertext Ct = Enc(Pk, m b ) and sends Ct to A 1 that resumes its computation from state st.
4.
A 1 submits queries for keys k i ∈ K for i = q 1 + 1, . . . , q and, for each such query, C computes Tok i = KeyGen(Msk, k i ) and sends it to A 1 . Simulation-based security In this section, we give a simulation-based security definition for FE similar to the one given by Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW11] . For simplicity of exposition, below, we present the definition for only one message; it is easy to see the definition extends naturally for multiple messages.
When
Definition C.3 [Simulation-Based security] A functional encryption scheme FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality F defined over (K, M ) is simulation-secure (SIM security, for short) if there exists a simulator algorithm Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) such that for all adversary algorithms A = (A 0 , A 1 ) the outputs of the following two experiments are computationally indistinguishable.
• Succinctness: A MI-FE scheme for p-TM is said to be succinct if the ciphertexts have size polynomial in the security parameter and in the size of the messages but independent on p (except for poly-logarithmic factors), and the tokens generated using KeyGen for machine M have size q(λ, |M |), where q is a polynomial and |M | is the size of the Turing machine, but independent on p (except for poly-logarithmic factors).
• Input-specific running-time: A MI-FE scheme is said to have input-specific run time if the decryption algorithm on input token Tok for machine M and encryptions of messages m 1 , . . . , m , takes time poly(λ, time(M, m 1 , . . . , m )). Moreover, in this case the scheme is a for a different functionality (that also outputs the time of the computation) changed in the obvious way.
We point out that in this paper we do not need to assume IND-Secure MI-FE schemes but only CRIND-Secure ones (see Section 2.3). For completeness we recall the definition of IND-Security for MI-FE schemes. with an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ). Below, we present the definition for only one message; it is easy to see the definition extends naturally for multiple messages. (st 0 , (Ct 1 , . . . , Ct )); 6. Output: (b = b ).
IND-Security
In above game we make following additional requirement:
• Let K denote the entire set of key queries made by adversary A. Then, the challenge vectors X 0 and X 1 chosen by A 0 must be compatible with K. This means that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , } and k ∈ K, it holds that F (k, ·, . . . , ·, x 0 i , ·, . . . , ·) = F (k, ·, . . . , ·, x 1 i , ·, . . . , ·).
The advantage of adversary A in the above game is defined as 
